Many countries impose taxes on foreign investors while also having in place targeted subsidies and tax incentives that are designed to attract them. This paper shows that such a policy can be optimal from the standpoint of a host country. The government has an incentive to tax inframarginal rms because they are relatively immobile. It also has an incentive to subsidize marginal rms because the economic activity generated by such a subsidy can increase domestic wages in excess of the scal cost of the subsidy. These tax and subsidy policies improve host country welfare at the expense of foreigners. This analysis is thus able to provide an explanation for why tax coordination eorts can simultaneously entail reduced taxes and subsidies on foreign rms.
Introduction
Many countries impose taxes on the income of foreign investors while also having in place subsidies and tax incentives that are designed to attract them. The subsidies and tax incentives are often targeted at the rm-level and negotiated on an individual basis. IMF et al. (2015) documents that the majority of countries make use of such discretionary incentives for FDI and that such policies are especially prevalent in developing countries. These policies are also common at the subnational level, with US states estimated to use discretionary incentives worth over $20 billion annually an amount that accounts for the majority of the total state resources devoted to business incentives (Bartik, 2001 ).
The magnitude of the incentives and subsidies provided to attract individual businesses can be very substantial in practice. In one prominent example, Dow Chemical received a $6.8 billion subsidy from the German government in 1996 to invest in a petrochemical plant, a subsidy that amounted to an estimated $3.4 million per job (OECD, 2002) . Under these types of policies, some rms eectively receive a net subsidy rather than merely paying reduced taxes, and so the government often loses net revenue (Peters and Fisher, 2002) . Such policies are thus commonly motivated by the notion that the benet to domestic workers generated by attracting mobile investors can exceed the scal cost to the government something that would generally not be the case of subsidies in a closed economy.
The current paper uses a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms to explain why a policy of simultaneously imposing taxes and subsidies on foreign rms can be optimal for a host country. The government has an incentive to tax rms that are inframarginal in their decision to locate in the country because the tax burden will then fall on the prots of these rms. It also has an incentive to subsidize foreign rms that are close to the margin in their location decision because these subsidies increase domestic wages at a relatively low scal cost. A government can use a uniform tax across rms combined with targeted subsidies a policy mix that is similar to what we see in reality to ensure a net tax on inframarginal rms and a net subsidy on marginal ones.
The optimality of the subsidy in this setting provides a formalization of the notion that attracting mobile rms can generate benets to workers that exceed the costs to the government in an open economy. The marginal subsidy is benecial here for a combination of two reasons. First, a subsidy targeted towards marginal rms avoids providing windfall gains to inframarginal rms and so has a relatively low scal cost. Second, by attracting rms to the host country, the subsidy increases labor demand and thereby increases the domestic wage. Together, these two factors imply that the benets to domestic workers of a suciently small subsidy exceeds the scal costs.
Underlying the wage increase in this setting is a type of terms-of-trade eect. In the model, the host and foreign country goods are dierentiated in a manner similar to Armington (1969) . Through FDI, foreign investors can produce their home country good in the host country. Since the wage in the host country is tied to the price of its domestic good through a freeentry condition for domestic rms, an appreciation in the relative price of the domestic good allows the increase in labor demand to translate into an increase in the real wage. Importantly, as in the Armington model, even a small country has some power to aect its terms-of-trade because the goods produced by rms from the two countries are dierentiated.
The taxes and subsidies discussed in this paper are optimal for the host country but they introduce ineciencies from the standpoint of the world as a whole. Consequently, policy coordination in this setting could simultaneously lead to reductions in taxes and subsidies. This is consistent with some seemingly contradictory aspects of international tax coordination. Specically, while countries and sub-national jurisdictions often discuss potential attempts to reduce harmful tax competition and especially the use of targeted subsidies bilateral tax agreements routinely involve reductions in the withholding taxes imposed on nonresidents. This eort to reduce both taxes and subsidies is particularly notable in the case of the EU, which has prohibited certain withholding taxes on dividends and royalties within the region, while at the same time setting up a State aid regime that curbs the use of preferential subsidies.
The emphasis of the current paper is on studying the incentives to target marginal vs. inframarginal rms, taking as given the government's ability to do so. The prevalence of discretionary incentives in practice suggests that countries at least believe they can identify the extent to which individual businesses wish to site in their country well enough for it to be worthwhile to do so. It is in general dicult to assess the extent to which this is in fact the case, especially given the often secretive nature of deals between governments and businesses. Bartik and Erickcek (2012) provide some relevant evidence in the context of the MEGA tax credits, a programme of discretionary incentives in the state of Michigan. This programme required businesses to submit documentation that their investment would be more protable in a non-Michigan location in the absence of the incentives, a requirement consistent with the desire to target marginal rms. Their results suggest that Michigan was able to target the correct rms well enough to be able to generate relatively large gains for the state.
In addition to explicitly discretionary policies, the framework developed in this paper can also help explain the use of incentives that are oered specically to new rms that site in a country. Such policies are used in many countries, most prominently in the form of tax holidays. New rms that are attracted to a country specically by these tax incentives would automatically be marginal rms. Hence, incentives provided to new investors could in part be self-targeted towards marginal rms. The analysis in this paper therefore implies that the basic rationale for a favorable treatment of new businesses could be similar to the rationale for using discretionary policies.
This paper is part of a growing literature that analyzes tax and subsidy policies towards mobile rms in settings with rm heterogeneity. Most work in this literature studies uniform policies across the heterogeneous rms.
1 An exception is Langenmayr et al. (2015) , who study incentives to dierentially tax high-and low-productivity rms, and nd that depending on the extent of prot-shifting opportunities, it may be optimal to discriminate in favor of either type of rm. As in much of the heterogeneous rms tax literature, their analysis emphasizes a corrective role for tax policies in the presence of imperfect competition. The current paper, by contrast, emphasizes endogenous wage determination in a model with perfect competition, and thus highlights quite distinct policy incentives and mechanisms. This paper is also connected to a strand of the tax competition literature that studies the desirability of preferential regimes in the presence of mobile and immobile tax bases (e.g. Janeba and Peters 1999; Keen, 2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003) . This existing work assumes that governments seek to maximize revenue, and so in contrast to the present paper, do not focus on whether taxes and subsidies can be optimal from the point of view of domestic welfare. This distinction is important especially in light of the fact that tax incentives oered to individual rms often lead to a net loss of revenue for the government. The current paper also diers from this existing work because it studies a setting with heterogeneous rms and is thus able to analyze the incentives to target policies at the rm-level.
The present work is also related to an international trade literature that studies the desirability of export subsidies. Particularly connected to the current paper, Itoh and Kiyono (1987) use a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods to show that export subsidies imposed on marginal sectors can improve domestic welfare. My paper shows that a similar logic applies in the case of governments seeking to attract FDI. Unlike in Itoh and Kiyono, how-1 See, for example, Burbidge et al. (2006) , Chor (2009) , Davies and Eckel (2010) , Püger and Südekum (2013) and Bauer et al. (2014) . ever, what is important here is attracting rms rather than new industries or export products.
The rest of the paper is ordered as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows that a tax on inframarginal rms and a subsidy on marginal rms both improve domestic welfare. Section 4 discusses additional implications of the analysis as well as some extensions. Section 5 concludes.
Model

2.1
Basic Setting I study a setting with two countries: the host (country 1) and the foreign country (country 2). The utility function of the representative household in country i is given by:
where x ij denotes the consumption in country i of the country j good. The country 1 and country 2 goods are dierentiated on the basis of the ownership country of the rm that produces the good. This is similar to Armington (1969) except that the dierentiation is specically based on who produces the good rather than where it is produced. This assumption can be motivated by the fact that rms in the two countries have access to dierent types of intangible capital and entrepreneurial characteristics that lead to a dierentiation in products they produce. I assume that both goods are freely traded at prices p 1 and p 2 , and good 2 will serve as the numeraire so that p 2 = 1.
The household in country i inelastically supplies its endowment of labor the sole factor of production at a wage of w i , which is determined endogenously within the model. The household's endowment of labor is denoted L i .
As in much of the new trade literature, FDI is modeled in this paper in terms of rms choosing their location of production rather than as a transfer of a homogeneous factor of production.
2 In addition to wage income, the household also receives a lump sum rebate of government revenue, T i , so that total household income is: w i L i + T i . Note that T i could be positive or negative depending on the type of policy the government chooses. Note also that due to free entry, there will be no pure prots that enter the household's budget.
I assume that preferences are identical and homothetic so that the demand functions can be written in the following form:
where θ j (.) is a function dened by the above expression.
In order to illustrate the central point of the paper as clearly as possible, it will be convenient to work under the assumption that the host country is small. The small country assumption is not conceptually essential in this paper but will allow us to focus sharply on the key mechanisms that drive the results. The small country assumption means that the host country takes foreign prices as given. Importantly, however, due to the dierentiation between the host and foreign country goods, even a small country does have some monopoly power in the market for its own good. As a result, as in a setting such as Armington (1969) , it has the ability to aect its terms-of-trade despite being small. I discuss the nature of the small country assumption in greater detail 3.1.
Production
Each country has a mass of rms, M i , that will be determined endogenously by free entry. Firms in each country produce their home country good under perfect competition. Individual rms are assumed to produce under decreasing returns to scale, reecting the presence of an implicit rm-specic 2 Introducing mobile capital as an additional factor of production would not, however, alter the basic results in this paper.
factor of production. The decreasing returns to scale allows us to incorporate xed costs and rm-level heterogeneity without introducing imperfect competition.
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In order to focus sharply on the main point of the paper, I assume that only rms from the foreign country engage in FDI. To do so, they must pay a xed cost that will permit them to produce in the host country instead of producing in their home country. These xed costs, f , vary at the rm-level and are drawn from a probability distribution G(f ) with density g(f ). Since the xed cost is the sole dimension of heterogeneity between rms, it will be convenient to index rms by their xed costs f .
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A rm producing in country i that is from j solves the following problem:
where F ij (l) is a production function satisfying F ij (l) > 0 and F ij (l) < 0, and τ ij (f ) and s ij (f ) are the tax and subsidy rate, respectively, faced by a rm with cost f . The results in this paper will focus on showing that certain types of policies improve domestic welfare, and I will discuss these specic policy instruments in Section 3. In order to avoid the presence of scal externalities that can complicate the interpretation of my results, I assume throughout that domestic rms receive no taxes or subsidies, i.e. τ ii = 0 and s ii (f ) = 0.
I relax some of these assumptions in 4.3.
The rm optimizes by setting the value of the marginal product of labor equal to the wage: Dharmapala et al. (2011) for more about a setting with heterogeneous rms, decreasing returns-to-scale production functions and free entry.
4 Unlike in much of international trade literature following Melitz (2003) , I assume that the heterogeneity is in the costs of FDI rather than in marginal costs of production. This is not essential for the main point in the paper but will simplify the exposition.
Note that given the nature of the policies here, the rm's problem conditional on location choice is undistorted. This problem gives rise to a pre-tax variable prot function, a supply function, and a labor demand function that we can dene as π ij (p j , w i ), q ij (p j , w i ) and l ij (p j , w i ), respectively.
A rm from the foreign country with FDI cost f has the option of producing in either country. The marginal rm that is indierent about where to produce is dened by:
In the absence of taxes and subsidies, a rm with a lower FDI cost would have a higher incentive to engage in FDI than a higher cost rm. The policies that I consider in Section 3 will be such that this will still be the case even with the taxes and subsidies. Thus, rms with with f < f * will produce in the host country, while rms with f > f * will produce in the foreign country.
Throughout this analysis, I study an equilibrium where at least some rms engage in FDI.
2.3 Equilibrium
The mass of rms from each country, M i , will be endogenously determined by a free-entry condition which states that a potential entrant makes zero expected prots net of a xed cost of entry φ i . This xed cost of entry is distinct from the xed cost of FDI, and does not vary across rms since potential rms are identical ex-ante. Since FDI costs are the sole dimension of heterogeneity in the model, and domestic rms do not engage in FDI, the free entry condition for domestic rms simply states that prots are deterministically equal to the xed costs of entry:
5 It can never be the case in equilibrium that all foreign rms engage in FDI because foreign labor would then be unused.
The condition for entrants in the foreign country is more complex:
The rst term above captures the prots when a rm draws a high FDI cost and produces at home. The second term captures the prots when the rm has a suciently low FDI cost and is engaged in FDI.
To close the model, we need market clearing conditions for goods and factors. The market clearing condition for good 1 and 2, respectively, are:
where W is world aggregate income. The left-hand side is the world demand for the good and is derived using (1). The right-hand side is the world supply. Since host country rms do not engage in FDI by assumption, the world supply for good 1 is entirely provided by the production taking place in the host country. Finally, the labor market clearing condition in country 1 and 2, respectively, are:
A point to be noted about this setup is that despite the fact that the goods are freely traded and the foreign good is produced in both countries in equilibrium, the wages in the two countries are not thereby xed. In other words, the model does not exhibit factor price insensitivity. In a setting with perfect competition, constant returns to scale and a single factor of production, the wage would be mechanically pinned down by the price of the good that rms are producing and as a result, when a good is produced in both countries, the relative wage of the two countries would be xed. This does not happen in the current model because rms produce under decreasing returns to scale, and so the nal good price no longer pins down the wage that rms are able to pay.
Inframarginal Taxes and Marginal Subsidies
This section will show that a tax on inframarginal rms and a subsidy for marginal rms both improve domestic welfare. To make it clear that these results do not derive from the interaction of the tax and the subsidy, or from potential scal externalities, I will initially analyze each policy separately.
Thereafter, I will show that it is optimal to simultaneously employ taxes and subsidies of this kind.
Small Country
In order to illustrate the central point of the paper as clearly as possible, I
assume that the host country is small. The small country assumption means that from the standpoint of the host country's policies, we can take the foreign wage, w 2 , the mass of rms in the rest of the world, M 2 , and world aggregate income, W , as given. The endogenous variables are then w 1 , p 1 , M 1 , and f * . The price of the domestic good p 1 is endogenous even for a small country here because of the Armington-style assumption of countrylevel product dierentiation.
6 These endogenous variables are determined by 6 Settings where small countries retain some market power in the goods they export are common in the international trade literature. In addition to the Armington model, this is a characteristic of monopolistically competitive models (see Helpman and Krugman, 1989) and Ricardian models with a continuum of goods (see Alvarez and Lucas, 2007) as well.
(2), (3), (4), and (5). Note that the small country ignores the foreign freeentry condition as well as the foreign market clearing conditions. The nature of the small country assumption here is similar to RodriguezClare (2009, 2013) and Bauer et al. (2014) , but with perfect competition instead of monopolistic competition.
Inframarginal Tax
Consider an equilibrium without taxes or subsidies. Now consider introducing what I will call an inframarginal tax. An inframarginal tax is a tax on foreign rms with suciently low f that leaves the marginal foreign investor untaxed. A tax will be inframarginal in this sense as long as the taxed rms have a low enough f and the tax rate is not too high. Of the conditions that determine the equilibrium in the host country, tax and subsidy policies only aect the marginal foreign investor condition, (2). Even the latter condition only depends on policies that aect the marginal rm. Thus, taxes on inframarginal rms have no eect on the equilibrium wage. Since these taxes do raise revenue, it follows that they increase domestic income and therefore improve domestic welfare.
Two points should be noted regarding this result. First, the prots of inframarginal rms are rents from the standpoint of the host country. They are, however, not true rents from a global perspective because they aect entry incentives in the foreign country through free-entry. The small country ignores this eect because the ex-ante probability of a potential foreign entrant locating in the host country is negligible.
Second, given the current setup, taxes can aect a rm's location choice but do not distort a rm's problem conditional on location. If there were an additional margin of distortion perhaps arising from the imperfect deductibility of variable expenses this proof would be more complex. Nevertheless, the key point that gives rise to an incentive to tax inframarginal rms is the fact that part of the tax burden falls on the prots of foreign investors, something that would be true even in the presence of intensive margin distortions.
Marginal Subsidies
We will now consider a policy whereby the government oers a subsidy to rms that are close to the margin in their location choice. Each subsidized rm will receive a xed subsidy s. Under this policy, the marginal foreign investor condition becomes:
We can now dene f, which will be a rm that is indierent about locating in the country without a subsidy in the equilibrium where the subsidy is employed, by the following condition:
The type of policy I consider is one where the subsidy s is oered to rms between f * and f. Importantly, this means that the rate of the subsidy is connected to the set of rms subsidized. As the subsidy rate goes to zero, the set of rms that can be attracted vanishes, and so f * approaches f. As the subsidy gets larger, f * and f diverge from each other.
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With the subsidy described in this manner, we can rst look at the eect of a small increase in the subsidy around s = 0 on the total subsidy bill. The subsidy bill is given by:
Dierentiating with respect to s and evaluating at s = 0, we obtain: 7 The nature of the subsidy here is similar to Itoh and Kiyono's (1987) export subsidy.
The derivative above has two terms. The second term captures the mechanical increase in the subsidy bill when the rate is increased, while the rst term captures the behavioral response. The fact that the eect of the behavioral response is equal to zero when s = 0 is unsurprising. What is special here is that even the mechanical increase in the subsidy bill is of second-order. This is the case because by construction, as the subsidy rate approaches zero, the subsidy base also vanishes. Intuitively, the closer to the margin one decides to target, the smaller the subsidy one needs.
The above analysis shows that the scal cost of a small subsidy increase around s = 0 is insignicant. With this result in mind, we can analyze the eect of the subsidy on household welfare. Welfare is given by the indirect utility function: V 1 (p 1 , w 1 L 1 + T 1 ). We can furthermore write p 1 as a function of w 1 , p 1 (w 1 ), using the domestic free-entry condition (3). The eect of the subsidy on welfare at s = 0 is then:
The third line above is derived using Roy's identity, and the fourth uses the fact that p 1 (w 1 )w 1 = p 1 (see Appendix A.1 for the proof ). Since the household spends some income on the foreign good, household income is greater than its expenditure on the domestic good:
Thus, the sign of the eect of the subsidy on welfare is the same as the sign of dw 1 /ds. The intuition for this is that a simultaneous increase in the wage and the price of the domestic good still implies greater purchasing power with respect to the foreign good.
To show that a small subsidy is optimal, it now suces to show that dw 1 /ds > 0. We can rst reduce the equilibrium with this policy into a system of two equations and two endogenous variables. First, recall that we can use the domestic free-entry condition to write p 1 = p 1 (w 1 ). Next, we can combine the goods market clearing condition and the labor market clearing condition to eliminate M 1 and obtain a single augmented labor market clearing condition:
The other remaining condition is the one that denes the marginal foreign investor, (6). Together, these two conditions will determine w 1 and f * .
The augmented labor market clearing condition implies a relationship between f * and w 1 that we can write as f * = Γ (w 1 ). Note that since the small country's share of global income is negligible, we can ignore the eect of T 1 on global demand. Appendix A.2 shows that ∂Γ/∂w 1 > 0. The intuition for this result is that if there are more foreign rms (higher f * ), wages have to rise to reduce the quantity of labor demanded and restore equilibrium.
The marginal foreign investor condition (6) implies a relationship between f * and w 1 that we can write as f * = Φ (w 1 , s). Appendix A.3 shows that ∂Φ/∂w 1 < 0 and ∂Φ/∂s > 0. The intuition for ∂Φ/∂w 1 < 0 is that at a higher wage, rms would be less willing to locate in the host country, and so the marginal rm has to be one with a lower cost of FDI. ∂Φ/∂s > 0 because a higher subsidy will encourage more rms to enter at any given wage.
With these two functions dened, the equilibrium w 1 is determined by:
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain:
The intuition is as follows. An increase in the subsidy attracts more rms, causing an increase in labor demand. In order to maintain equilibrium, the wage must rise. As discussed earlier, the sign of dw 1 /ds also determines the sign of dV 1 /ds for a small subsidy. Thus, it follows that a small subsidy improves domestic welfare.
Putting together the pieces of this proof, we see that the subsidy is optimal because of an interplay of two factors. First, a suciently small subsidy targeted towards marginal rms has a negligible scal cost. This is ultimately the case because such a subsidy is constructed so as to not provide windfall gains to inframarginal rms. Second, the subsidy increases the domestic wage by attracting more rms to the host country. These two points together imply that the benet to domestic workers exceeds the scal cost of the subsidy, leading to an overall improvement in the host country's welfare.
Note that the increase in labor demand that the improvement in welfare makes possible necessarily comes at the cost of decreased labor demand in the foreign country. The host country is thus stealing rms and the investment they embody from the foreign country through this policy. This leads to an increase in the relative wage of the host country w 1 /w 2 , a point that follows immediately from the fact that dw 1 /ds > 0 and w 2 is unaected by the host country.
Furthermore, the fact that dw 1 /ds > 0 is essentially equivalent to dp 1 /ds > 0 since the domestic free-entry condition has allowed us to write p 1 as an increasing function of w 1 . Since the price of the foreign good is the numeraire, p 1 is the conventional terms-of-trade and dp 1 /ds > 0 captures an improvement in the terms-of-trade. With this numeraire choice, w 1 /w 2 is the single factoral terms-of-trade (Viner, 1937) and hence the increase in the wage as dened here can itself be thought of as a type of terms-of-trade appreciation.
If p 1 were xed by the world market so that there would be no terms of trade eects possible w 1 would also thereby be xed owing to free entry, and dw 1 /ds would be equal to zero. Without terms-of-trade eects, the increased entry by foreign rms would not translate into an increase in labor demand because it would perfectly crowd out the labor demand of domestic rms.
This illustrates how the presence of terms-of-trade eects here is essential to ensure the intuitive property that a subsidy that attracts foreign rms will increase domestic wages. The assumption that the host and foreign country goods are dierentiated as discussed in 2.1 ensures that even a small country does have some market power with respect to its own good so that p 1 is not, in fact, xed by the world market.
Simultaneous Taxes and Subsidies
The results so far have shown that a tax on inframarginal rms and a subsidy to marginal rms each improves welfare separately. We will be able to establish that it is optimal for the host country to simultaneously impose taxes and subsidies through similar arguments. The earlier argument that inframarginal taxes improve welfare applies without modication even in the presence of a subsidy to marginal rms.
To establish the optimality of the subsidy, the analysis needs to take into account how the subsidy will aect tax revenue. In particular, by increasing wages, the subsidy will reduce the prots of foreign rms and thereby reduce tax revenues. In Appendix A.4, I show that a suciently small subsidy will improve welfare in the presence of inframarginal taxes despite this scal externality. It is thus optimal for the host country to simultaneously tax inframarginal rms and subsidize marginal ones.
As discussed in the introduction, countries generally use uniform taxes combined with targeted subsidies. Such a policy often leads to a net subsidy on targeted rms combined with a net tax on untargeted rms. Provided the targeting is based on the marginality of a rm, this is essentially equivalent to the simultaneous tax and subsidy policy considered here.
Additional Implications and Extensions
Global Distortions and Coordination
The results from the previous section explain why countries have incentives to tax inframarginal rms and subsidize marginal ones. Given the nature of these policies, they improve domestic welfare at the cost of foreigners. By reducing investment and labor demand in the rest of the world, subsidies hurt foreign workers. As discussed earlier, this is equivalent to an improvement in the host country's terms-of-trade, and so necessarily implies a deterioration of the foreign country's terms-of-trade. The inframarginal taxes here are also distortionary from a global perspective because by reducing the expected prots of foreign entrants, they would aect business creation incentives in the rest of the world.
Given that these are distortionary policies that improve domestic welfare at the cost of foreigners, the global rst-best optimum would entail no such taxes or subsidies. The model thus suggests why tax coordination eorts could lead to reductions in both taxes and subsidies on foreign investors. This is consistent with the fact that countries often discuss coordination eorts to ght tax competition but are also routinely engaged in tax treaties that mutually reduce the tax burden faced by foreign investors.
Particularly notable in this regard, the European Union has prohibited the imposition of certain types of withholding taxes on foreign investors from member countries. At the same time, it has also issued directives curbing preferential regimes sustained by what it deems to be discriminating subsidies. The analysis in this paper provides an explanation that rationalizes this simultaneous eort to curb the imposition of taxes and subsidies.
Implementability and Targeting
Throughout this analysis, I have assumed that the government is able to distinguish marginal rms from inframarginal ones. I discussed in 3.4 how a policy of this type could be constructed using a uniform tax in conjunction with targeted subsidies. As discussed in the introduction, this is close to the actual practice we observe in most countries, as governments do negotiate with rms and provide subsidies and tax incentives on a discretionary basis while generally having in place relatively uniform taxes. The fact that governments do so suggests that they believe they have enough information on the willingness of individual rms to site in their country to make such policies worthwhile. While it is dicult to assess the extent to which governments are indeed able to target eectively in general, as mentioned in the introduction, Bartik and Erickcek (2012) nd some evidence from Michigan suggesting that the state government was able to target suciently well so as to ensure to a relatively large benet for the state.
In addition to discretionary policies, governments often oer statutory incentives specically to new rms siting in a country or jurisdiction, most prominently in the form of tax holidays. The argument made in this paper regarding the optimality of targeted subsidies can also apply to these type of incentives. To see why that is the case, suppose that we start in equilibrium without any subsides. Next, oer a small subsidy only to new rms that site in the country. The new entrants the rms that did not site in the host country prior to the subsidy being imposed but did so after are automatically marginal rms. Thus, a policy of oering incentives to new rms that enter a country could in this sense be self-targeted towards marginal rms.
As with discretionary incentives, such a policy would allow the host country to avoid providing windfall gains to inframarginal businesses.
Of course, such a policy will be eective only if the new entrants are in fact ones that are attracted to the country by the policy. To the extent that there are changes in economic conditions that make a country more attractive to foreign investors or to the extent that a country is transitioning to a new equilibrium, new entrants will not necessarily be marginal rms. New entrants that are inframarginal in their location choice in this manner would still receive a windfall gain from this subsidy. Still, this type of policy would at the very least avoid providing windfall gains to existing inframarginal rms and so in that sense, would still be self-targeted to a certain extent.
While a more thorough analysis of these types of policies towards new rms would require a dynamic model of entry that is beyond the scope of the present paper, these considerations are clearly suggestive of a useful role for such policy instruments. More generally, these points suggest that the rationale for discretionary incentives and the rationale for providing incentives to new rms could be closely linked. Both of these policies can make sense in the framework of the current paper because they are both means to target subsidies towards marginal rms rather than providing windfall gains to inframarginal ones.
Taxes and Subsidies in the Foreign Country
The results from Section 3 are derived under the assumption that foreign investors would pay no taxes and receive no subsidies if they remained in their home country. This assumption was made to make clear that the results do not derive from the presence of potential scal externalities but is not essential for any of the results. The conditions that the host country takes into account in setting its policies are (3), (4), (5), and (6). An inframarginal tax in the foreign country would not aect any of these conditions and so would not aect the optimality of the tax or subsidy for the host country.
In case of a marginal subsidy given by the foreign country to its own rms, a subsidy would change (6) to:
where s 1 and s 2 now denote the host and foreign country subsidy rates, respectively. The only change here relative to Section 3 is that marginal rms would now receive a subsidy of s 2 in the foreign country. This s 2 is a constant from the point of view of the host country and so the analytics showing the optimality of the tax and subsidy would remain completely unchanged.
Hence, a suciently small marginal subsidy is optimal for the host country regardless of the tax and subsidy policies set by the foreign country.
Many Countries
A natural question is whether the results in this paper will still hold when there are many countries rather than just two. To see how this type of extension will aect the analysis in Section 3, we can consider a setting where rms can engage in FDI in N potential host countries. I will show that the N host country case can be collapsed to an analysis that is qualitatively almost identical to the two country case so that the earlier results still hold. In order to save on notation, I still consider a case where the rms engaged in FDI are from a single residence country.
8
I denote the country whose rms engage in FDI as country F . Firms in country F are now assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of a vector of xed FDI costs f = (f 1 , ..., f N ) that is drawn from a multivariate distribution.
Each component of the vector captures the xed cost of engaging in FDI in a dierent host country. This form of heterogeneity can be motivated by the fact that individual rms will generally have idiosyncratic reasons to prefer one potential host country over another.
The prots of a marginal rm when it sites in a country i are now: π iF (w i ) + s i − f i w F , where s i is the subsidy provided by country i. We will consider the optimal policy from the standpoint of a given country which is again assumed to be small so that it takes foreign policies and prices as 8 Apart from notational complexity, the analysis would be largely unchanged in case of multiple countries whose rms can engage in FDI.
given. Without loss of generality, this country will denoted as country 1.
For a rm with a xed cost vector f , the prots from siting in the best location except for country 1 can be written as: max j =1 {π jF (w j ) + s j − f j w F }.
Based on this setup, the benet to siting in country 1 net of the opportunity cost of siting elsewhere is then π 1F (w 1 )+s 1 −f 1 w F −max j =1 {π jF (w j ) + s j − f j w F }. We can dene a variable A ≡ max j {π jF (w j ) + s j − f j w F } − f 1 w F . Firms with a higher value of A have a lower incentive to site in country 1 than rms with a lower value. While A depends on the entire xed cost vector f , it is itself a scalar value.
The key step in extending the analysis from Section 3 to the case with many countries will be to use the scalar A rather than the vector f to index the foreign rms that are engaged in FDI. Note that while A does depend on foreign prices and subsidies, it does not depend on any domestic prices or subsidies. Thus, for a small country that takes foreign prices and policies as given, the ordering of rms implied by A will not change when the country changes its own policies. A is therefore a consistent index.
With this re-indexing, marginal rms can be dened as satisfying the following:
We can also dene the rms that will be indierent about locating in country 1 in the absence of a subsidy as:
While marginal rms can have dierent values of f , by construction, they all have the same value for A. Instead of working with a multivariate distribution over f , we can now directly work with the probability distribution for A that we will denote G (A).
Next, we re-derive the equations and conditions from Section 3 that the small host country treats as endogenous. The demand for the country j good in i, (1), becomes:
where p ≡ (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p N , p F ) is a vector with the price of each country's good.
We will continue to take the price in the country whose rms engage in FDI as the numeraire so that p F = 1. Given the small country assumption, this means that prices other than p 1 will be xed from the standpoint of country 1.
The domestic free entry condition (3) is unchanged. The goods market clearing condition (4) becomes:
The only change here is that we again have the vector p now instead of a single price in the demand function. Finally, the domestic labor market clearing condition (5) becomes:
The only dierence relative to Section 3 is that we have a probability distribution dened over the new index and corresponding denition of marginal rm G (A * ) rather than a probability distribution dened directly over the costs of FDI.
Other than some relabeling, the only substantial dierence between the conditions that dene the equilibrium now and those in the earlier sections of the paper is that we have a vector of prices p instead of a single price. However, as noted earlier, the only price in p that is not xed from the standpoint of the small country is its own price, p 1 . That being the case, the analytics showing the optimality of both the inframarginal tax and the marginal subsidy will be exactly the same here as in Section 3. By re-indexing the rms in terms of A, we have eectively collapsed the multiple country case into something that is very similar to the two-country case. Thus, the presence of many countries does not qualitatively alter the fact that it is optimal in this setting to tax inframarginal rms and subsidize marginal ones.
This of course does not mean that the number of countries is unimportant.
The number of potential host countries will aect the mass of rms that are marginal vs. inframarginal in any given country. To see how the number of host countries aects the equilibrium outcome in a simple way, assume that of the N potential host countries, one of the countries country 2, without loss of generality ceases to be a potential host country. Prior to the loss of country 2 as a potential host country, there would be some rms in country 1 who were close to the margin in terms of siting in country 1 and country 2 but strongly prefer country 1 to the third-best alternative, i.e.:
The loss of country 2 as a potential host country would lead such rms which were initially close enough to the margin to receive a subsidy to become inframarginal rms that do not receive a subsidy.
Intuitively, when the number of countries is smaller, there are fewer margins along which rms can be indierent in their location choice. This means there will be fewer marginal rms and more inframarginal ones. When there are a greater number of potential host countries, there will therefore be be less scope to generate revenue by taxing inframarginal rms and there will also be more rms that are close to a location choice margin and so are potentially worth subsidizing.
Conclusion
This paper shows that a policy of simultaneously taxing and subsidizing foreign investors can be optimal for a host country. A tax on inframarginal rms raises revenue at the expense of these rms' prots, while a subsidy on marginal rms can increase domestic welfare by attracting foreign rms at a relatively low scal cost. The optimality of the subsidy here provides a formalization of the common notion that the economic activity generated in a jurisdiction by attracting mobile rms can have benets to domestic workers that exceed the scal cost to the government.
These policies improve domestic welfare at the expense of foreigners and so are not optimal from the standpoint of the world as a whole. Consequently, the model is able to explain why bilateral treaties entail reductions on taxes on foreign investors while at the same time, policymakers are concerned about the harmful competitive eects of subsidies and tax incentives.
Consistent with these considerations, the European Union in particular has abolished some types of withholding taxes on foreign investors within the region while also attempting to curb the use of preferential subsidies. The analysis in this paper can help make sense of such seemingly anomalous aspects of international tax coordination.
A Proofs
A.1
Dierentiating the domestic free entry condition with respect to s, we obtain:
A.2 Function implied by the augmented labor market clearing condition
The augmented labor market clearing condition is: The derivations above repeatedly use the fact from Appendix A.1 that w 1 p 1 (w 1 ) = p 1 . Points 3 and 4 rely on the homogeneity of the supply and factor demand function, respectively. These expressions imply that ∂Γ (.) /∂w 1 > 0. Government revenue is now given by:
The eect of the subsidy on revenue at s = 0 is:
where L 12 ≡ M 2 l 12 (w 1 ) is the total labor used by foreign rms in the host country, and τ 12 ≡´f * 0 τ 12 (f ) g(f )df is the average tax rate. We see from the above derivative that unlike in the case without taxes, the scal cost of a small subsidy increase is no longer equal to zero. This is because the subsidy reduces tax revenue by reducing the prots of foreign rms. We now need to take this scal externality into account. where L 11 is dened as the total labor used in production by domestic rms.
Since host country labor is used either by foreign rms, or by domestic rms, or in order to pay xed costs of entry, L 1 = L 11 + L 12 + M 1 φ 1 . Furthermore, w 1 M 1 φ 1 is equal to the variable prots of domestic rms because of free entry. Thus, w 1 M 1 φ 1 + w 1 L 11 is the sum of prots and wages and so must be equal to rm sales, p 1 q 11 . The term−p 1 x 11 + p 1 M 1 q 11 gives the exports (i.e. production minus consumption) of the domestic good in value terms and so is positive. Since the conditions determining the equilibrium are still the same, the earlier argument that dw 1 /ds > 0 holds without modication and a small subsidy will necessarily improve welfare even in the presence of inframarginal taxes.
